Downer v. Personal Insurance Co., 2012 ONCA 302 (C.A.)
The issue on this appeal was whether the plaintiff was in an “accident” that entitled him to accident benefits.
On February 26, 2000, the plaintiff was physically assaulted by several unidentified assailants while parked at a gas station sorting his money. He escaped by putting his car in gear and driving away. He believed he may have run over one of his assailants in the course of fleeing. He claimed he sustained psychological and physical injuries as a result of the incident.
The insurer initially paid benefits, but then took the position that the injuries were not caused by an accident within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the SABS, which defines an "accident" as “an incident in which the use or operation of an automobile directly causes an impairment”. The motion judge granted a declaration that the plaintiff was involved in an “accident” within the meaning of the SABS. The insurer appealed.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal with respect to the physical injuries, holding that the physical assault did not constitute an “accident”. The Court held that a trial was required to determine whether the psychological injuries were caused by the ordinary use of a motor vehicle.
The proper test to be applied is the modified causation test set out in Greenhalgh v. ING Halifax Insurance Co. (2004), 72 O.R. (3d) 338 (C.A.):
1. Was the use or operation of the vehicle a cause of the injuries?
2. If the use or operation of a vehicle was a cause of the injuries, was there an intervening act or intervening acts that resulted in the injuries that cannot be said to be part of the “ordinary course of things?” In that sense, can it be said that the use or operation of the vehicle was a “direct cause” of the injuries?
At paragraph 39, Justice LaForme held that under the modified causation test, it is not enough to show that an automobile was the location of an injury inflicted by tortfeasors, or that the automobile was somehow involved in the incident giving rise to the injury. Rather, the use or operation of the automobile must have directly caused the injury. Justice LaForme held that an assault on the plaintiff as he sat in his vehicle sorting money cannot be considered a normal incident of the risk created by the use of operation of the car. With respect to the psychological injuries, he held that running someone over could be considered a normal incident of the risk created by the use or operation of a vehicle.
One has to wonder whether this case has limited applicability due to its facts, or whether it will give rise to more claims of psychological injuries in order to fit an incident into the definition of “accident” within the SABS.
The issue on this appeal was whether the plaintiff was in an “accident” that entitled him to accident benefits.
On February 26, 2000, the plaintiff was physically assaulted by several unidentified assailants while parked at a gas station sorting his money. He escaped by putting his car in gear and driving away. He believed he may have run over one of his assailants in the course of fleeing. He claimed he sustained psychological and physical injuries as a result of the incident.
The insurer initially paid benefits, but then took the position that the injuries were not caused by an accident within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the SABS, which defines an "accident" as “an incident in which the use or operation of an automobile directly causes an impairment”. The motion judge granted a declaration that the plaintiff was involved in an “accident” within the meaning of the SABS. The insurer appealed.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal with respect to the physical injuries, holding that the physical assault did not constitute an “accident”. The Court held that a trial was required to determine whether the psychological injuries were caused by the ordinary use of a motor vehicle.
The proper test to be applied is the modified causation test set out in Greenhalgh v. ING Halifax Insurance Co. (2004), 72 O.R. (3d) 338 (C.A.):
1. Was the use or operation of the vehicle a cause of the injuries?
2. If the use or operation of a vehicle was a cause of the injuries, was there an intervening act or intervening acts that resulted in the injuries that cannot be said to be part of the “ordinary course of things?” In that sense, can it be said that the use or operation of the vehicle was a “direct cause” of the injuries?
At paragraph 39, Justice LaForme held that under the modified causation test, it is not enough to show that an automobile was the location of an injury inflicted by tortfeasors, or that the automobile was somehow involved in the incident giving rise to the injury. Rather, the use or operation of the automobile must have directly caused the injury. Justice LaForme held that an assault on the plaintiff as he sat in his vehicle sorting money cannot be considered a normal incident of the risk created by the use of operation of the car. With respect to the psychological injuries, he held that running someone over could be considered a normal incident of the risk created by the use or operation of a vehicle.
One has to wonder whether this case has limited applicability due to its facts, or whether it will give rise to more claims of psychological injuries in order to fit an incident into the definition of “accident” within the SABS.
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